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Abstract
We argue that ownership strategies can be a double edged sword for multinational 
family business groups from emerging economies and the performance of their 
affiliates located abroad. We test an integrated framework based on internalization and 
agency theory on a longitudinal dataset of multinational family business groups from 
Taiwan. We find evidence for the contingent impact of cultural differences and family 
management on the association between ownership strategy and affiliate performance. 
While direct ownership is seen as offering more control over the affiliate, we show that 
this comes at a performance cost for affiliates in culturally different host countries and 
affiliates under family management. Indirect ownership seems to be one way to 
positively influence affiliate performance in culturally distant countries, but seems not 
to be contingent on family management utilisation. 
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Ownership Strategy and Foreign Affiliate Performance in Multinational Family 
Business Groups: A Double-edged Sword 
1. Introduction
We investigate the effects of ownership strategies on foreign affiliate’s 
performance in multinational family business groups from an emerging economy. We 
thereby address two gaps in current international business literature. First, with the 
growing economic importance of emerging markets, new forms of corporate 
governance emerge that established international business literature struggles to 
integrate in existing conceptual frameworks (Cumming, Filatotchev,  Knill, Reeb, & 
Senbet, 2017; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). For instance, multinational family business 
groups (MFBGs) surface as the key economic forces from many emerging economies 
(Singh & Gaur, 2013; Ramamurti & Singh, 2009), and bring with them different 
ownership and management strategies to control their affiliates abroad (Gaur & Delios, 
2015; Singh & Delios, 2017; Singh & Gaur, 2009). How the distinctive governance 
structure of those MFBGs impacts strategy and performance is a critical issue in 
international business field (Singh & Delios, 2017; Singh & Gaur, 2009). Second, 
MFBGs from emerging economies show a more pronounced usage of indirect 
ownership and family management to control foreign affiliates (Aguilera & Crespi-
Cladera, 2016; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). Although there is ample of 
literature on direct ownership stakes and performance in foreign affiliates (e.g. 
Brouthers, 2002; Gaur & Lu, 2007) existing research often neglects the importance of 
indirect ownership as a cross border control tool for MFBGs. Existing studies also show 
little consistency in their findings reaching from positive, negative, to non-significant 
links between ownership strategy and foreign affiliate performance (e.g., Brouthers, 
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2002; Contractor, Yang & Ajar, 2016; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Shirodkar & Konara, 
2017). 
We believe that such complex ownership strategies can be a double-edged sword 
for MFBGs from emerging economies. For example, indirect ownership means the 
family controls a wide range of affiliates through crossholdings and magnifies relatively 
small levels of ownership to achieve control in a family business group (Almeida & 
Wolfenzon, 2006; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Morck et al., 2005). While 
indirect ownership requires less financial resources and allows for faster 
internationalization, it is also a corporate governance technique that might not be easily 
transferred across borders (Cumming et al., 2017). Indirect ownership also signifies a 
lower degree of commitment to the foreign affiliate (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). 
Because of their aversion to outsider influence, MFBGs might complement such 
governance structures with family management in order to maintain direct managerial 
control. So far, the effects of transferability of corporate governance, and family 
management techniques have rarely been investigated in a single comprehensive study 
on emerging market MFBGs. For instance, Gaur and colleagues provide tentative 
insights into how group affiliation and ownership structure of Indian business groups 
may generate contingent impact on the relationship between performance and 
internationalization strategy (e.g., Gaur & Delios, 2015; Gaur & Kumar, 2009; Gaur, 
Kumar, & Singh, 2014); however, they do not consider more detailed corporate 
structure aspects such as the supplementary use of family management in affiliates 
abroad. Singh and Delios (2017) for instance, is one of the nascent studies that look at 
the internal governance workings of an enterprise. They include governance structure 
as well as family ownership characteristics to examine the growth strategies of 
enterprises from an emerging economy. However, their study does ignore the 
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distinctive direct and indirect ownership structure of a family business group on the 
foreign affiliates.
In order to shed further light on that issue, we employ the theoretical perspectives 
of internalization theory and agency theory. An integrated approach is justified in our 
case because not only do we need to focus on transaction cost minimising governance 
structures, which is the stronghold of internalization theory, but also the nature and role 
of ownership, which is best investigated using agency theory (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Lang, 2000 ; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). In particular, internalization theory provides 
our framework with key contingencies that guide multinational corporate governance. 
For instance, reducing uncertainty in cross border transactions requires an 
understanding of how easily governance structures can be transferred abroad across 
cultural differences (Brouthers, 2002; Magnusson, Baack, Zdravkovic, Staub, & Amine, 
2008). On the other hand, agency theory allows us to understand more complex 
corporate governance structures, such as indirect ownership and how potential conflicts 
of interest affect foreign affiliate performance.  
This study contributes to current literature as follows. First, we develop an 
integrated framework that includes key characteristics of MFBGs from emerging 
economies such as the lack of fully functioning financial markets in the home country 
and the resulting emphasis on indirect ownership in foreign affiliates (Bhaumik, 
Driffield & Pal, 2010; Contractor et al., 2016). Second, we also link with existing family 
business literature that emphasises their aversion to outsider influence (Erdener & 
Shapiro, 2005; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse & Lien, 2007). We therefore investigate 
how the management technique of using family managers, interacts with ownership 
strategies and resulting affiliate performance. Third, we utilize longitudinal data from 
foreign affiliates of MFBGs (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
5
This is important because family enterprise’s internationalization has been previously 
investigated predominantly from a corporate perspective (Gómez-Mejía, Makri & 
Kintana, 2010). In particular, this study focusses on performance at the affiliate level, 
since affiliates are directly affected by ownership strategies (Levy, 2009). Lastly, we 
also follow Singh and Gaur’s (2013) call for more research on complex family 
enterprises that dominate many emerging economies, in our case Taiwan.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Foreign affiliate ownership strategies and performance in multinational 
family business groups
Although the impact of family ownership on internationalization decisions and 
overall performance has been investigated before (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Erdener & 
Shapiro, 2005; Filatotchev et al., 2007), surprisingly few studies have focussed on the 
link between ownership strategies and affiliate performance. Within the ownership 
strategy literature, direct ownership has received the most attention. There is some 
agreement that direct ownership manifests the controlling family’s commitment and 
interest on the focal affiliate, with positive performance implications (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002). This is because greater financial commitment also 
increases the managerial attention the affiliate receives, as well as the potential 
expansion of mandates for example. Direct ownership also reduces uncertainty in 
decision making. By uncertainty we mean the unpredictability of decision outcomes. 
However, the case is less straight forward for indirect ownership. For instance, previous 
studies suggest that indirect ownership increases the controlling family’s likelihood to 
behave opportunistically and can cause principal-principal agency conflicts (Claessens 
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et al., 2000, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). Principal-principal agency conflicts occur when 
family owners behave in way that places minority shareholders at a disadvantage, hence, 
the ownership interests are not aligned. In other words, direct and indirect ownership in 
a family business group is seen as a trade-off between the costs of family opportunism 
and the benefit of family commitment (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008). 
From a broader agency theory perspective the case seems therefore rather straight 
forward: direct ownership is good, and indirect ownership is bad for foreign affiliate 
performance. 
This changes, however, if we include internalization theory considerations. The 
theory suggests that firms internationalize with a transaction costs minimizing 
corporate governance structure, to access, develop, or utilize resources (Dunning, 1988, 
2001).  Hence, international ownership strategy is driven by firm specific resources 
(Rangan, 1998), rather than with the intention to exploit minority stakeholders as 
suggested in agency theory. This is of importance especially in the case of MFBGs from 
emerging markets which might require a higher degree of financial flexibility to finance 
international expansion (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Bhaumik et al., 2010; Levy, 
2009). Although some MFBGs from emerging markets appear cash rich, the lack of 
trust in financial markets and intermediaries, and the family’s traditional desire for 
control, indicate a preference for conservative financial self-reliance during 
international expansion (Liang, Wang, & Cui, 2014; Shirodkar & Konara, 2017). 
Additionally, indirect ownership might also be a way to address a shortage of tried and 
trusted family management resources (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2012). Hence, 
indirect ownership might be an alternative ownership strategy for MFBGs to maintain 
family control in the long run during international expansion. In other words, the impact 
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of ownership on affiliate performance, according to internalization theory, is contingent 
on a number of conditions that affect the deployment and utilization of firm specific 
resources (Brouthers, 2002, 2013; Contractor et al., 2016). This aspect is less clear from 
an agency theory perspective alone. 
The above considerations lead us therefore to believe that an integrated framework 
based on agency and internalization theory is most suitable to better understand the 
impact of ownership strategies on foreign affiliate performance. This is further 
underpinned to two adjacent arguments. First, family enterprises have the option to use 
of family management as an additional and unique way to influence foreign affiliate 
development (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2012). Second, from traditional 
internalization theory, we also need to consider the moderating impact of differing 
cultural contexts in order to understand the transferability of corporate governance 
across borders (Cumming et al., 2017). Both will be discussed next.  
2.2. Cultural differences, ownership, and foreign affiliate performance
Cultural differences between home and host country refer to differences in values, 
norms and habits1. How those cultural differences effect ownership strategy has been 
investigated in the ownership literature with mixed results (Chakrabarty, 2009; Liesch, 
Welch & Buckley, 2011; Kim & Gao, 2013). Cultural differences matter because they 
provide an indication for the transferability of corporate governance practises across 
1 That is not to say that cultural differences are exhaustively representing differences between countries. 
Ghemawat (2001) for instance identifies four different dimensions; the organisational theorist Scott 
(1995) identifies three. However, studies indicate that cultural differences are important factors that 
explain a good amount of variation between countries (e.g.; Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Dahms, 2015; 
Dahms (in press), Dikova et al., 2010). We also would also like to reiterate that cultural differences can 
be seen as a more direct threat to family tendency on lowering the external involvement than say 
economic or administrative differences between countries.  
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country borders (Cumming et al., 2017). Especially cultural differences affect the 
transfer of family business specific values and norms (Chakrabarty, 2009; Tsang, 2001). 
The transferability might be hindered by cultural differences because they represent 
additional costs for communication and interpretation, and increase asymmetric 
information as well as liability of foreignness (Hennart, 2009; López-Duarte & Vidal-
Suárez, 2013). Furthermore, cultural differences also create uncertainty in decision 
making and might therefore be considered as a threat to families’ control over the 
business (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010).
This threat to the unique characteristics of family enterprises is likely to influence 
ownership strategies. For instance, a lower financial commitment might be preferred 
by the family enterprise in order to retain maximum financial flexibility in host 
locations with larger cultural differences (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
This might be especially the case for MFBGs from emerging markets, due to financial 
and managerial resource constrains. Indirect ownership also provides more flexibility 
in terms of managerial decision making in the foreign affiliate and hence reduce the 
uncertainty that would otherwise be encountered by transferring the home grown 
corporate governance structure, which is likely to occur under direct ownership. This 
is contrary to agency theory expectations, which would predict negative performance 
implications for indirect ownership in the affiliate due to principal-principal agency 
conflicts (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Instead, we argue that, 
from an internalization theory perspective (Brouthers, 2013), when faced with larger 
cultural differences between home and host country, indirect ownership is an optimal 
ownership structure to minimize transaction costs leading to positive performance in 
the affiliates.  
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Direct ownership, on the other hand, represents a stronger financial and managerial 
commitment to the foreign affiliate (Filatotchev et al., 2007). However, family 
businesses are often short of managerial talent. This is because of their reluctance to 
have outsiders influence strategic decision making and the therefore limited career 
prospects they can offer (Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 
2012). This is of particular relevance in culturally distant environments in which the 
foreign affiliate might be confronted with the burden of liability of foreignness (Hennart, 
2009; Shirodkar & Konara, 2017). For instance, linking into local networks might come 
with prohibitively high transaction costs. Hence, the additional costs incurred by direct 
ownership of affiliates in culturally different locations, might outstrip family 
management and corporate governance capability. We therefore depart again from 
agency theory predictions and argue that direct ownership in such foreign affiliates 
negatively moderates their performance.  In other words, direct ownership is not 
sufficient to internalize the externalities caused by cultural differences. 
Hypothesis 1: Cultural differences will negatively moderate the association between 
direct ownership and foreign affiliate performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Cultural differences will positively moderate the association between 
indirect ownership and foreign affiliate performance.
2.3. Family management, ownership, and foreign affiliate performance
The utilization of family management is a distinctive family firm specific 
management characteristic (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007). The use of family 
members as managers to exercise control over foreign affiliates is very common (Chung, 
2014), although the empirical evidence on its impact on performance itself is mixed 
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(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Zahra, 2003). We argue here that there exists a link between 
ownership strategy, family management utilisation, and foreign affiliate performance.
Direct ownership represents a vested interest in the foreign affiliate and greater 
financial and managerial commitment by the MFBG. From an agency theory 
perspective, assigning a family manager might therefore provide the family enterprise 
with an increased sense of control (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). It might also ensure an 
alignment of the different ownership interests. From an internalization perspective, the 
use of family managers eases the flow of intangible knowledge within the MFBG and 
consequently supports the utilization and deployment of firm specific resources (Gaur, 
Delios & Singh, 2007). Family management also reduces internal transaction costs in 
minimising the need to internationally transfer home grown formal control mechanisms 
(Zahra, 2003). However, it also increases the costs of developing external relationships 
due to increased liability of foreignness for instance (Hennart, 2009). This might be in 
particular relevant for MFBGs from emerging markets which might be also interested 
in accessing location specific resources (Dunning, 2001; Erdener & Shapiro, 2005). 
These additional costs are likely even more severe for MFBGs from emerging markets 
that might lack adequately qualified family managers (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-
Bueno, 2012). Hence, internalization theory predicts a negative association between 
direct ownership and foreign affiliate performance if a family manger is heading the 
affiliate. 
From an internalization theory perspective, indirect ownership is seen as a 
preference for financial flexibility rather than control over the affiliate itself (Almeida 
& Wolfenzon, 2006; Levy, 2009). Indirect ownership is also used to protect the family 
business from potential opportunistic behaviour of the foreign affiliate (Filatotchev et 
al., 2008). Another scenario is that indirect ownership, especially during international 
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expansion, is a financial necessity. Family financial resource constrains might make it 
necessary to send a family manager in an affiliate that is only indirectly owned to 
establish trust among the other shareholders and stakeholders for instance. Hence, use 
of family management in indirectly owned foreign affiliates might actually reduce 
agency conflicts. Levy (2009) observes similar behaviour in the Belgian family 
business group Colruyt, which strategically placed its family members to complement 
control over indirectly owned affiliates. Similar behaviour has also been found in 
MFBGs from emerging markets (Luo & Chung, 2005).  Hence, family management 
positively moderates the association between indirect ownership and affiliate 
performance.
Hypothesis 3: Family management will negatively moderate the association between 
direct ownership and foreign affiliate performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Family management will positively moderate the association between 
indirect ownership and foreign affiliate performance.
3. Research method
3.1. Data and sample
This study utilizes a multinational family business group sample in Taiwan from 
1999-2003 (e.g., Chung & Chan, 2012; Luo & Chung, 2005). We examined this time 
period since it was without major economic shifts such as the IMF crisis that occurred 
during the early 1990s (Lasserre & Schütte, 2006; Luo & Chung, 2005). The 
researchers classified as a family business group, businesses managed or controlled by 
a specific family or set of families and owned by a previous generation of the same 
family (or families). This definition is consistent with prior studies (Anderson & Reeb, 
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2003; Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2005). The result was a sample of 51 family business 
groups.
The creation of family ownership structure in foreign affiliates is a strategic 
decision that occurs at the affiliate level; however, the character of the nested family 
business group will influence each foreign affiliate decision. Thus, the multi-level and 
longitudinal nature of the data for the family business groups examined by this study 
makes appropriate the use a hierarchical linear model (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) to 
consider the growth pattern of the data. It also deals with possible intra-level 
correlations. Researchers argue that combining panel data with the possible level-of-
analysis concern can overcome a biased inference and the implicit assumption that 
cross-sectional analysis on the single level may occur (Dansereau, Yammarino, & 
Kohles, 1999).
One benefit of panel data in multi-level design and the utilization of relevant data 
analysis techniques is that researchers can treat the data from each level and each year 
as separate data points (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Dansereau et al., 1999). Thus, for 
each year, we can examine foreign affiliate performance and use the information from 
that year in our analysis. In total, we have 2,398 foreign affiliate-level data points 
operating in more than 30 host countries. A detailed sample overview can be found in 
appendix A1 & A2.
3.2. Variables
Dependent Variable (Y): Foreign affiliate performance. As indicated by previous 
studies (e.g., Brouthers, 2002, 2013; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gaur & Lu, 2007), the 
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performance of foreign affiliates is often treated as company secret. Hence, it is hard to 
obtain accounting-based performance data from foreign affiliates. Other studies utilize 
survey based data to measure foreign affiliate performance (e.g., Brouthers, 2002 & 
2013; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gaur & Lu, 2007). In this study, we use the financial 
performance in each foreign affiliate to indicate if the foreign affiliate performs 
efficiently or productively. We utilize the sales revenue to indicate foreign affiliate 
performance (Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Zahra, 2003). The sales revenue in each foreign 
affiliation can also measure the foreign affiliate’s international performance (Errunza 
& Senbet, 1984).  
Ownership Stakes Variables (O1 & O2): Direct and indirect ownership in a 
foreign affiliate. To calculate the foreign affiliate ownership stakes in each family 
business group, we utilize the measurement of direct and indirect ownership originally 
developed by Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) and La Porta et al. (1999, 2002). We identify 
the major shareholders and their shares in each affiliate, including domestic and foreign 
affiliates, from multiple sources of secondary databases, such as the China Credit 
Information Service (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). The data from the China Credit 
Information Service shows each affiliate’s major shareholders and percentages of 
ownership. Affiliates’ major shareholders can be individuals, companies, or both. If 
there is missing data on how many shares major shareholders own we sought that 
information from the annual reports. In the case of a family business groups, family 
members can exert ultimate control over the family business group through both direct 
and indirect ownership types. In La Porta and his colleagues work, they define a firm’s 
ownership structure as indirect if: (1) it has an ultimate owner and (2) there is at least 
one listed affiliate between it and the ultimate owner in the chain of 20 percentage 
voting right (La Porta et al., 1999: 477). However, La Porta, Claessens, and their 
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colleagues cover only listed affiliates (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999, 
2002), but here we can include units that are both private and listed affiliates. Therefore, 
we define a controlling shareholder as someone who has x percent indirect control over 
firm A if (1) the shareholder directly controls firm B, which, in turn, directly controls x 
percent of the votes of firm A or (2) the shareholder directly controls firm C, which, in 
turn, controls x percent of the votes of firm B, and firm B directly controls x percent of 
the votes of firm A. When multiple shareholders have different percentages of the votes 
in the control chain, we pick the one with the highest minimum voting stake along the 
chain (La Porta et al., 1999, 2002), which is also the weakest link in the chain (Claessens 
et al., 2000). The measurement of indirect ownership in a foreign affiliate (O2) is the 
sum of shares pertaining to cross-shareholding of a focal foreign affiliate that involves 
more than one listed affiliate in the same family business group. 
Further, direct ownership in a foreign affiliate (O1) is the sum of the shares in a 
focal foreign affiliate that is directly owned by family members, i.e. the shares 
registered in any family member’s name (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; La Porta et al., 
1999, 2002). For instance, suppose that firm A has four major shareholders: (1) 10% of 
its shares owned by one family member, (2) 15% of its shares owned by a brother-in-
law, and (3 & 4) 20% and 17% of its shares individually owned by another two 
affiliations in the same family business group. In this case, we calculate the family 
direct control in firm A is 25% (10% plus 15%)
Moderating Variable (M1): Cultural differences. This study utilizes the 
measurement method developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) to measure cultural 
differences between host and home country based on Hofstede’s (1980) culturally 
integrated index. The Hofstede’s (1980) culturally integrated index indicates the taken-
for-granted and shared understanding of the social life in a country, and contains 5 
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dimensions (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation 
and power distance) in the culturally integrated index. This cultural difference 
measurement developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) is utilized previously (e.g., Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2010; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). This study codes the country scores and 
calculates the cultural differences to indicate the specific cultural differences between 
Taiwan and the host country year by year. 
Moderated variable (M2): Family management in the foreign affiliate. Following 
previous studies, we utilize a dummy-coded variable to indicate whether the foreign 
affiliate CEO is the family member or not (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). We identify a family member as the CEO of a foreign affiliate from 
multiple secondary databases, including business group directories, public information 
in newspapers, magazines, or website information. We utilize the last name of the 
person to identify whether the foreign affiliate CEO has direct blood relationships with 
the founder and also the siblings since they are all influential in the family enterprise 
network (Chung & Chan, 2012; Luo & Chung, 2005).
Control Variables. The level of analysis in this research is the foreign affiliate, and 
each foreign affiliate is nested in a specific family business group. Thus, we must 
control the influence from the group-level and foreign affiliate-level variables. Table 1 
contains the descriptions of all the control variables used in this study. 
Table 1: Control Variables List
Group-level Control Variables
Name Measurement Reference










The total foreign assets of the business group in each year Harzing, 1999
Group 
performance 
The accounting-based measurement of the performance in the family 
business group 
Khanna and 




The entropy measurement is defined as ID= Σi[Siln(1/Si)], where Si is defined 
as the sales attributed to global market region i, and ln(1/Si) is the relative 
weight given to each global market region (the logarithm of the inverse of its 
sales). The foreign market regions are classified as Africa, Asia and Pacific, 





A dummy-coded variable to indicate whether the family founder still serves 
as the key decision-maker in this family business group
Morck et al., 2005
Foreign affiliate-level control variables
Manufacturing 
foreign affiliate














The foreign affiliate’s assets in a specific year Gong, 2003; 
Shirodkar and 
Konara, 2017
GDP growth rate 
of the host 
country
GDP growth rate of the host country indicates the potential growth 





This variable is measured by calculating the differences of the log 
transformed GDP per capita between home and host country year by year 
during the period examined 




Average labor cost of the host country indicates the potential operation cost 
in the host country 
Harzing, 1999
3.3. Method
In this study we use longitudinal multi-level data. Therefore, this study employs 
the Multilevel Mixed-effects Maximum Likelihood Model (ML model) in STATA 9.0 
software. Researchers use the ML model in regression when the data is characterized 
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by influences from the nested group-level variables and from the foreign affiliate-level 
variables (Dansereau et al., 1999; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). The repeated 
foreign affiliate observations from the same family business group may result in foreign 
affiliate observations nested in the same group. Therefore, we selected this model to 
account for the effects from the group-level influence and the effects from the foreign 
affiliate-level influence. 
To ensure the appropriateness of the data for this model of analysis, we conduct a 
number of tests.  First, we employ the test developed by Brown and Forsythe (1974) to 
test the null hypothesis of equality of variances across groups. The test rejected the null 
assumption of homoskedasticity across the panel. Next, since the data is characterized 
by a multi-level term with a longitudinal concern, the model selected has to consider 
the growth pattern of the data and also deal with the possibly intra-level correlation 
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Dansereau et al., 1999). We also account for 
contemporaneous correlation—that is, the residuals of units observed in each time 
period correlate with residuals, the model selected needs to consider the observation 
from each year as a separate data point (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). We perform 
the Hausman test to justify whether the fixed-effect or random-effect model is specified. 
The test suggests the fixed effect model. 
4. Analysis
4.1. Correlations 
The bivariate correlations in Table 2 indicate that the dependent variable, i.e., the 
foreign affiliate’s performance, has a positive correlation with indirect ownership in 
family business groups. The family indirect ownership in foreign affiliate correlates 
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significantly with several variables, including the cultural differences between the 
home and the host country, and the use of family management in the foreign affiliate. 
The results of the causal analysis are discussed next. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. Foreign affiliate sales revenue 0.04 0.20
2. Direct ownership 0.90 0.41 -0.02
3. Indirect ownership 0.12 0.11 -0.12* 0.02
4. Cultural differences 2.15 1.23 0.05** 0.01 0.13**
5. Family management 0.38 0.35 -0.02 -0.01 0.23** 0.21**
6. Group age 39.35 16.73 0.14** -0.03* 0.04** -0.07** -0.04**
7. Group asset 1.18 14.05 0.37** 0.02 -0.17** 0.01 -0.16** 0.08**
8. Group performance 1.64 3.99 0.05** -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05** 0.05** 0.04**
9. Founder leadership 0.46 0.50 0.10** -0.01 0.07** -0.04** 0.08** -0.07** 0.13** 0.08**
10. International diversification 0.55 0.32 0.33** 0.01 -0.04** 0.13** 0.02 -0.06** 0.07** -0.01 0.04**
11. Group’s foreign experiences 1688.10 1530.68 0.60** 0.01 -0.12** 0.04** -0.03 0.08** 0.53** 0.02 0.16** 0.24**
12. Manufacturing foreign affiliate 0.29 0.46 0.12** -0.03 -0.11** -0.36** -0.15** 0.09** 0.01 0.01 0.12** -0.02 0.07**
13. Distribution foreign affiliate 0.13 0.03 0.06** -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.06** 0.07** -0.05** 0.04** -0.05** 0.06** 0.01 -0.27**
14. Foreign affiliate age 5.75 5.25 0.06** -0.02 0.13** -0.07** 0.07** 0.14** 0.07** -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 0.08** 0.02 0.14**
15. Foreign affiliate asset 144.73 67.98 0.08** 0.01 0.14** 0.03* 0.07** -0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.13** 0.03 -0.06** 0.14**
16. GDP growth rate 0.08 0.47 0.07** -0.01 0.05** -0.06** 0.01 0.20** 0.07** -0.07** 0.08** 0.01 0.08** 0.08** -0.01 0.01 -0.04*
17. Economic differences 0.56 0.39 0.05** -0.03 -0.11** -0.44** -0.22** 0.12** 0.01 -0.01 0.10** -0.13** 0.01 0.50** -0.08** -0.10** 0.03* 0.07**
18. Average labor cost of host 
country
1725.84 1395.73 0.03* 0.02 0.13** 0.60** 0.21** -0.10** 0.02 -0.01 -0.06** 0.12** 0.06** -0.48** 0.08** 0.07** 0.02 -0.06** -0.56**
Note: * if P≦0.05, ** if P≦0.01(two tailed); Group’s asset, Group’s foreign asset, and Foreign affiliate’s asset are indicated by US. million dollars; average labor cost of the host country is indicated by U.S. dollars
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4.2. Causal Analysis
This research tests several models to investigate the causal effects of the control 
variables and the integrated influence from the ownership stakes and moderated factors. 
The Wald chi-square values are significant for all models. Therefore, this research 
satisfies the model-of-fitness and the model setting. 
Several of the group-level and the foreign affiliate-level control variables were 
significant. Table 3 shows that some of the foreign affiliate’s characteristics 
significantly influence the foreign affiliate performance. Specifically, industry (whether 
the foreign affiliate has a manufacturing or distribution function), age, and assets all 
have significant effect on the foreign affiliate performance. Additionally, the host 
country average labour cost as well as the relative economic differences between the 
home and the host country influences the foreign affiliate performance. 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 argued that cultural differences moderate the 
association between ownership stakes and foreign affiliate performance. Looking at the 
isolated effect from ownership first, we find that direct and indirect ownership stakes 
only have a weak association with foreign affiliate performance. However, as we 
consider the moderated factors, the ownership stake impact on the foreign affiliate 
performance is becoming significant. 
Table 3 shows that cultural differences negatively moderate the association 
between direct ownership and affiliate performance. We also found that cultural 
differences positively moderate the association between indirect ownership and affiliate 
performance.  Therefore, H1 and H2 are supported. 
Hypothesis 3 argued that family member management negatively moderates the 
association between direct ownership and affiliate performance. This has been 
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confirmed. However, in hypothesis 4 we argued that family management will positively 
moderate the association between indirect ownership and affiliate performance. 
Although we predicted the correct directionality, the value failed to become statistically 
significant. We will discuss the results in the following section. 
Table 3: Causal Analysis Results
Y=Foreign affiliate sales revenue M1 M2 M3-1 M3-2 M4
Constant 0.64 (3.15) 0.57 (3.16) 1.24 (3.15) 1.43 (3.15) 2.81 (3.78)
Single Effect of Ownership stakes
Direct ownership in foreign affiliate










Cultural differences * direct ownership -0.03 (0.02)* -0.03 (0.01)*
Cultural differences * indirect ownership 0.22 (0.11)* 0.19 (0.12)*
Family CEO in foreign affiliate * direct ownership -0.76 (0.33)* -0.70 (0.32)*
Family CEO in foreign affiliate * indirect ownership 0.41 (0.27) 0.32 (0.27)
Moderators
Cultural differences






Manufacturing foreign affiliate 1.48 (0.12)** 1.46 (0.12)** 1.42 (0.12)** 1.43 (0.12)** 1.39 (0.12)**
Distribution foreign affiliate 1.72 (0.12)** 1.73 (0.12)** 1.62 (0.13)** 1.69 (0.12)** 1.59 (0.12)**
Foreign affiliate age 0.04 (0.01)** 0.04 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)** 0.04 (0.01)** 0.03 (0.01)**
Foreign affiliate asset 0.85 (0.20)** 0.85 (0.02)** 0.86 (0.02)** 0.86 (0.02)** 0.87 (0.02)**












Average labor cost of the host country 0.01 (0.02)+ 0.02 (0.01)+ 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.02)*
Control Vs.-Group level
Group’s age -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03)













Level of international diversification 0.23 (0.23)+ 0.28 (0.23)+ 0.26 (0.23) 0.27 (0.23) 0.26 (0.23)



















Wald Chi-2 185.57** 161.96** 138.46** 136.62** 119.88**
Number of foreign affiliates 2669 2661 2661 2659 2659
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51
Note: 1. Standard deviation data given in parentheses; + if P≦0.10, * if P≦0.05, ** if P≦0.01
5. Discussion & Conclusions 
In this article, we addressed two main gaps in current international business 
literature; the first was to suggest a way to integrate newer forms of corporate 
governance prevalent in emerging markets, such as MFBGs, in current international 
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business frameworks. Second, we focus on two concrete examples of such corporate 
governance practises, direct and indirect ownership, and their effect on foreign affiliate 
performance under the contingencies of cultural differences and family management. 
We propose an integrated conceptual framework based on internalization and agency 
theory. Using a sample of longitudinal data of Taiwanese MFBGs we empirically tested 
our predictions. We also extend existing studies by focusing on the affiliate level of 
performance rather than the business group itself. 
Overall, we found that ownership strategies are indeed a double edged sword for 
MFBGs in that the effects on foreign affiliate performance are contingent on cultural 
differences and family management involvement. Our results support the 
argumentation that larger cultural differences negatively moderate the association 
between direct ownership and foreign affiliate performance (Hypothesis 1). It supports 
our view that MFBGs still struggle to manage cross border cultural differences. 
However, we also show that indirect ownership in the foreign affiliate is a way to 
circumvent such additional governance and management costs (Hypothesis 2). This 
provides support for the notion that MFBGs seek ways to mitigate the effects of limited 
transferability of corporate governance and management across country borders. For 
instance, while Bhaumik et al. (2010) show that the governance structures of family 
enterprises might hinder their international expansion, we extent their research in 
showing that family enterprises also possess governance structures to circumvent such 
potential disadvantages. 
We also include the contingency of family management in our framework. We 
found that family management negatively moderates the association between direct 
ownership and affiliate performance (Hypothesis 3). Thus, while family management 
and direct ownership are likely to reduce internal cost of transaction, the negative 
23
externalities incurred through, for instance liability of foreignness, appear to outweigh 
those internal benefits. This finding expands the argument by Hennart (2009) for 
instance in showing that negative externalities, caused by lacking local network access, 
might be even more pronounced in the case of MFBGs from emerging markets. We 
also expand Bhaumik et al. (2010) who only considered shareholdings in affiliates, but 
neglected the possibility to use family managers as a control mechanism in MFBGs. 
Lastly; we found that the link between indirect ownership and performance was not 
significantly moderated by family management (Hypothesis 4). This might be because 
the impact of actual family management might be more symbolic in indirectly owned 
affiliates rather than operational. In a way, indirect ownership might also indicate a lack 
of integration of the affiliate with the rest of the multinational network (Contractor et 
al., 2016), and family management itself is not sufficient to generate more than 
figurative influence.
5.1. Conceptual implications 
In this article, we suggested an integrated theoretical framework that applied 
insights from internalization and agency theory perspectives. We believe such an 
approach contributes to future theory development because it allows incorporating the 
unique characteristics of MFBGs from emerging economies. For instance, financial 
markets might be less developed in emerging economies and hence the traditional 
expectation from agency theory that indirect ownership creates principal-principal 
agency conflicts (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999, 2002) might 
provide only an incomplete picture of the internationalization process in MFBGs. 
Instead, we argued that indirect ownership can also be a necessity for such family 
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businesses because of their preference for financial autonomy and the aversion to 
outsider influence. We thereby expand the discussion initiated by Filatotchev and 
Wright (2011) in emphasising the complementarities between the two perspectives. By 
focussing on cultural and family management contingencies, we also build upon the 
discussions by Cumming et al. (2017). In particular, we emphasise the mutual 
importance to include company specific contingencies such as family management and 
external ones such as cultural differences in order to understand the transferability of 
corporate governance strategies across borders. 
Furthermore, our conceptual framework consisting of agency and internalization 
theory also complements the more commonly used institutional theory lens (e.g. Gaur 
& Lu, 2007; Shirodkar & Konara, 2017). From an institutional theory perspective, 
multinationals are likely to mimic local management practises to increase performance 
in host countries. This focus on external contingencies, however, neglects the internal 
workings of firms and of multinational family business groups from emerging markets 
in particular. Our framework suggests that internal transaction costs minimising 
rational determines firm ownership structure, staffing decisions, and performance in 
foreign affiliates. This seems in particular relevant to multinationals from emerging 
markets, which might lack the resources and experience to adapt their firm specific 
advantages to local institutional pressures. 
Therefore, we believe that we also contribute to the wider debate in emerging 
market multinationals research. This is because in those emerging markets 
multinational family business groups tend to capture the majority of economic activity 
(Chang, 2006). Within those companies, family ownership plays an important role in 
corporate decision making. Other researchers, such as Steier et al. (2015) or Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2010), argue that they also differ in the way decisions are rationalized. In 
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particular, the focus on the preservation of socioemotional wealth plays a dominant role. 
However, our research departs from their sole focus on socioemotional wealth 
preservation concern. While we acknowledge the importance of family management as 
a vital impact on MFBG’s decision making, we also highlight that financial realities, in 
our case ownership decisions in foreign-affiliates, influences affiliate performance 
beyond mere socioemotional wealth considerations. This is because even family owned 
emerging market multinationals need to actively compete abroad in order to retain their 
status at home. 
Lastly, our results also provide some indication on how MFBGs deal with strategic 
ambidexterity, in our case to simultaneously manage exploration and exploitation 
(O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013). MFBGs from emerging economies in particular might 
struggle to align their resources and their strategy. In this study, we showed that family 
management, seen as a family firm specific resource can also impede performance and 
thereby making the achievement of organisational ambidexterity much harder (Raisch 
& Birkinshaw, 2008). Hence, while research on strategic ambidexterity is still ongoing 
(e.g. Junni, Sarala, Taras, & Tarba, 2013), we indicate that MFBGs from emerging 
economies, with their distinct characteristics such as family management as a key 
resource, might require further conceptual attention.
5.2. Managerial and policy implications
Besides the above theoretical contributions, this study also offers interesting 
managerial and policy implications. For instance, managers at MFBG headquarters and 
affiliate level need to be aware of the limited transferability of home grown governance 
and management structures. This is especially the case in locations that show 
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pronounced cultural differences which might go beyond the managerial capability of 
the family management team. An indirect ownership strategy might be more promising 
in such constellations. Policy makers should also be aware of cultural differences 
between home and host country when attracting foreign direct investment. Larger 
cultural differences might put an additional managerial burden on the multinational and 
subsequently the affiliate performance. After all, the performance of the foreign affiliate 
is an important consideration for the sustainability of the investment by the MFBGs. 
5.3. Limitations and future research
Our study has limitations which could provide the basis for future research. The 
first one is on the sample. This study relied on a sample of Taiwanese MFBG’s. It 
thereby reduces bias often found in other studies that focus exclusively on developed 
countries. However, it would be beneficial to extent the sample and include MFBG’s 
from other countries to see the generalization of the findings from this study or even 
conduct comparative studies among countries, such as India and China (e.g., Singh & 
Gaur, 2009). This is because MFBGs from Asia tend to have a far bigger extended 
family member network than family enterprises from home countries with traditionally 
smaller core families (Chandler, 1977; Hamilton, 1997)2. For example, for those family 
enterprises in U. S. A., even though the founding family ownership has significant 
performance impact (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), these family enterprises tend to move 
to non-family oriented managerial forms over time (Chandler, 1977). However, in Asia, 
the founding family still remains dominant on both ownership and management control, 
even in foreign affiliates. Besides extending the sample to other similar cultural 
2 We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
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locations, we also suggest that further researches can extend the concept of closely 
personal links to other non-family business groups in East Asia since in those non-
family business groups those close founding team members can reach the status of 
‘inner circle’ on decision-making rights that is quietly similar to the family members in 
a family business group even though these founding team members might not be actual 
blood ties among them (Luo & Chung, 2005; Chung & Dahms, 2016). 
Second, the number foreign affiliates are not evenly distributed among business 
groups in our sample and thus may cause the biased analysis among the groups. We 
chose the sample to gain a full picture of Taiwanese MFBGs international activities, 
rather than just focussing on certain international champions only. Hence, while some 
family business groups have a larger number of foreign affiliates, others do not. 
However, the utilization of longitudinal data as well as multiple family business group 
analysis can reduce the possible distribution bias caused by the non-evenly distributed 
problem. Additionally, according to the information in appendix A1, family business 
groups may decide their ownership and management decision in foreign affiliates based 
on the foreign affiliate characteristics rather than the absolutely number of foreign 
affiliates. Thus, controlling the nested group factors as well as the foreign affiliate 
factors are helpful to understand the relationships among variables in MFBGs sample. 
In sum, because MFBGs from emerging economies play an increasingly important role 
in the global market, understanding the role of family influence is a critical issue. 
Therefore, although the single-country sample in this study is a limitation, the evidence 
in this study illustrates the important influence of founding family on ownership and 
management in MFBGs and further researches can extend the findings to understand 
more about the coordination and control issues of MFBGs.
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Furthermore, performance of foreign affiliates can be assessed in a number of ways. 
In line with relevant studies (e.g. Brouthers, 2002, 2013; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Gaur 
& Lu, 2007), we have chosen the foreign affiliate sales as a proxy for performance; 
however, more in depth and possibly a mix of subjective and objective performance 
indicators might provide a richer picture of performance as an outcome of ownership 
strategies in foreign affiliates. Furthermore, sales figures can also be subject to 
company transfer pricing policies. Future research might include more extensive 
performance measures, such as return on sales or return on assets (e.g., Gaur & Kumar, 
2009; Singh & Gaur, 2009). Moreover, we found that family management has no 
moderating impact on affiliate performance. We suggested that was because of the 
figurative nature of such assignments; however, qualitative in depth case studies would 
be required to verify our suggestion. Lastly, we have looked at family management 
from the position of managing directors in the foreign affiliates. Adjacent studies (e.g. 
Hiebl, 2013) have indicated that other positions within the top management team, such 
as chief financial officers, can also play a crucial role in family business decision 
making. It might therefore be worthwhile for future studies to take a broader perspective 
on the positioning of family vs non-family managers in the MFBG’s hierarchy. 
5.4. Conclusion
In this study, we argue that ownership strategies can be a double edged sword for 
MFBGs in relation to performance of the foreign affiliates. While the link between 
ownership and performance in foreign affiliates has been investigated before (e.g. 
Contractor et al., 2016; Shirodkar & Konara, 2017), the implications for family 
enterprises as a dominant corporate form in many emerging economies (Chakrabarty, 
2009), has so far received less attention. We found evidence for the contingent impact 
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of ownership on affiliate performance. While direct ownership might be tempting to 
gain a sense of control over the affiliate, we show this comes at a performance cost for 
affiliates in culturally different host countries under family management. Indirect 
ownership seems to be one way to positively affect affiliate performance in culturally 
distant countries, but seems not to be contingent on family management.
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Members as the 
Head of Foreign 
affiliates
Manufacturing 31 41.52 5450.02 57.48 26.24 0.87 0.12 2.18 0.47
Non-metal Mineral 3 46.33 3034.52 38.13 19.67 0.89 0.11 1.51 0.62
Textile, Apparel and 
Leather 
6 38.28 6245.37 48.62 17.48 0.84 0.11 1.92 0.45
Food 2 37.50 6851.29 104.00 37.10 0.90 0.07 1.98 0.12
Chemical and Plastic 3 40.40 15105.74 45.27 22.67 0.89 0.12 1.82 0.83
Transportation 2 51.00 4557.87 83.00 23.40 0.87 0.04 2.67 0.30
Electronic and 
Household Appliances
8 36.64 4183.84 67.72 37.56 0.85 0.16 2.37 0.52
Paper Manufacturing 2 49.00 1613.09 41.50 15.80 0.93 0.11 1.99 0.24
Steel and Metals 
Equipment
1 39.00 888.30 13.00 5.80 0.99 0.13 2.47 0.34
Electronic Wire and 
Mechanics Equipment
3 44.00 5044.27 69.60 37.80 0.91 0.11 2.38 0.44
Constructing 1 56.40 1427.03 19.80 9.80 0.09 0.02 2.81 0.36
Service 19 30.04 11460.58 45.17 11.00 0.99 0.11 2.03 0.40
Financial Service 11 27.40 15997.69 40.35 12.14 1.04 0.08 2.11 0.36
Logistics Service 1 36.00 2191.98 22.80 4.40 0.94 0.31 2.11 0.46
Transportation 2 34.50 6820.87 38.50 12.80 0.87 0.10 1.47 0.45
Constructing 
Investment
5 30.81 3649.76 51.95 9.52 0.85 0.24 2.13 0.49
Others 1 42.00 11091.10 105.40 7.20 0.95 0.18 1.99 0.67
Summary 51 36.78 7771.18 52.52 20.06 0.90 0.12 2.15 0.45
Note: 1.*All data calculated at year-end 1999 to 2003. We calculate the data by averaging the within-group data over 
5-years, and then calculate the average data within a specific industrial sector. Industrial sector definitions of business 
groups based upon nature of core company business. If the core company of the business group is both engaged in 
manufacturing and service sectors, this business group will be classified to other category.
2. This table reveals the family business groups description, not the foreign affiliates description in each group.
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Appendix A2: Foreign Affiliates Data by Host Country 

















Asian Region 2820 5.84 45.55 27.62 0.89 0.12
China 1319 5.91 38.26 31.64 0.89 0.12
Hong Kong 755 5.23 43.01 21.25 0.88 0.12
Southern Korea 12 4.75 22.44 7.86 0.87 0.08
Japan 68 6.62 23.66 39.39 0.86 0.15
Singapore 223 6.56 52.25 30.12 0.90 0.12
Vietnam 59 5.08 13.96 5.92 0.85 0.07
Philippines 114 5.93 39.43 17.25 0.94 0.05
Indonesia 54 7.30 28.13 25.29 0.93 0.12
Thailand 67 6.67 58.16 43.27 0.90 0.24
Malaysia 123 6.55 61.92 31.31 0.89 0.12
Cambodia 5 5.40 42.57 17.03 0.99 0.20
India 5 8.40 17.60 9.13 0.84 0.12
People's Republic of 
Bangladesh
1 5.00 15.49 8.40 0.45 0.00
United Arab Emirates 8 4.25 1.55 1.57 0.59 0.02
Israel 3 3.67 9.43 2.84 0.01 0.01
Jordan 4 4.75 15.31 11.79 0.89 0.01
American Region 1911 5.61 45.77 33.36 0.93 0.11
U.S.A. 463 5.77 33.89 24.17 0.87 0.10
Canada 51 6.31 60.24 18.54 2.85 0.15
Mexica 19 3.53 20.67 13.51 0.83 0.53
Bahamas 1 1.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00
Honduras  4 7.75 8.64 2.57 0.66 0.01
Panama 53 4.94 31.76 9.67 0.92 0.05
Samoa 13 7.23 44.71 61.20 0.91 0.07
Brazil 5 4.60 17.78 11.77 0.60 0.01
Costa Rica 5 5.80 47.21 42.34 0.89 0.40
Colombia 1 6.00 9.76 1.44 1.00 0.00
European Region 237 5.90 29.51 33.86 0.89 0.12
U.K. and overseas territories* 1416 5.58 45.83 35.05 0.88 0.12
U.K. 102 6.20 42.19 37.12 0.88 0.17
France and overseas 
territories**
8 6.25 22.75 34.21 0.92 0.12
Netherland and overseas 
territories*** 
45 6.18 40.44 40.45 0.93 0.16
Ireland 3 7.00 16.33 18.24 0.99 0.67
Belgium 5 1.60 1.92 0.01 0.60 0.01
Germany 34 5.56 25.59 30.21 0.82 0.12
Italy 7 4.86 10.58 4.88 0.83 0.14
Luxembourg 3 17.00 71.71 78.68 1.00 0.65
Denmark 5 4.00 8.57 6.20 0.95 0.00
Czech Republic 36 5.58 16.31 6.85 0.96 0.22
Poland 2 6.50 18.27 0.01 0.01 0.00
Slovakia 6 3.83 62.51 83.40 0.87 0.00
African Region 13 4.92 145.62 11.29 0.88 0.12
Mauritius 13 4.92 145.62 11.29 0.88 0.12
Overseas Regions (includes 
the Independ islands or the 
overseas territories)****
61 5.33 20.39 16.43 0.85 0.07
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New Zealand 1 5.00 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.00
Australia 23 5.65 20.19 6.75 0.80 0.09
Summary 5048 5.75 44.73 29.83 0.90 0.12
Note: 1.All data calculated at year-end 1999 to 2003. We calculate the data by averaging the within-group data over 
5-years, and then calculate the average data within a specific country.
2.* U.K. and overseas territories include U.K., the B.V.I. Islands, the Samoa Island, and the Bermuda Islands.
3.** France and overseas territories includes France and New Caledonie.
4. *** Netherland and overseas territories includes Netherland and the Netherland Antilles.
5.**** The Overseas regions includes the New Zealand, the Australia and the overseas territories that are not in the 
domain land of the country.
6. This table reveals the foreign affiliates description by host country, not the family business group description.
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